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persuasive reasons to favor incumbent licensees in renewal proceed-
ings, the decision in Citizens Communications Center appropriately
permits the FCC some leeway to impose a greater burden on challeng-
ers."1 In the face of a statutory provision that does not favor incum-
bents,82 however, there are tangible limits placed upon this authority
which, failing amendment of the Communications Act, are inescapa-
ble. If the short period of license effectiveness does indeed pose a great
problem for the radio and television industry, it is clear that amend-
ment of the statute is a more efficacious approach to solving the
problem than the stretching of administrative authority beyond its
proper limits. No compelling reason exists why an amendment to the
Communications Act need be destructive of competition, as the
amendment proposed in the Senate subsequent to the WHDH
decision would have been,' An alternative which might be considered
is an extension of the period of license effectiveness.' Such an ap-
proach has the possibility of resulting in greater industry stability,
without distortion of the administrative process or a total stifling of
competition.
IV. INTERVENTION
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE CHARGING PARTY IN UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS
Courts have limited the procedural rights of charging parties in
unfair labor practice proceedings by interpreting the National Labor
Relations Act' to protect only public rights, thereby precluding any
8 1. See notes 58, 72 supra and accompanying text.
82. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
83. See note 51 supra.
84. The extension of the licensing period to, for example, eight or ten years, might have the
effect of making licensees too secure in their positions to create a sufficient incentive to improve
broadcasting quality. However, if such a change were combined with a mandatory public
hearing halfway through the license period solely on the acceptability of the performance of the
licensee, with loss of license occurring if "substantial service," or some other appropriate
standard of service, has not been rendered, this problem could be avoided. A hearing of this
nature, while of the kind declared improper in the Citizens Communications Center decision,
might be appropriate as an interim proceeding under an amended communications statute.
I. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
[Vol. 1972:115
ADMINISTRA TIVE LA W-1971
consideration of private interests.2 Commentators have criticized this
exaltation of public rights as unjustifiably harsh on the private parties
involved in labor disputes 3 and a constant pressure is exerted in litiga-
tion to recognize the interests of private parties as well. 4 This section
will discuss the effect of three recent cases5 on charging parties who
apply for mandatory injunctions or raise objections to proposed com-
promise settlements. Additionally, the right to appellate review will
be analyzed for its impact upon pre-review procedural rights.
Mandatory Injunctions
Although the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA almost en-
tirely eliminate the use of injunctions in labor disputes, a narrow
exception is made for certain particularly serious unfair labor practice
charges' for which the NLRB may initiate injunction procedures. 7
2. Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers Local 610, 440 F.2d 124, 129 (8th Cir. 1971); Teamsters
Local 282 v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1964); 3 DAVIs § 22.13, at 273-75; Jaffe, The
Public Right Dogma in Labor Cases, 59 HARV. L. REV. 720 (1946); Comment, The Charging
Party Before the NLRB: A Private Right in the Public Interest, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 786 (1965);
Comment, Extent of Discretion Exercised by District Courts in Issuing Temporary Injunctions
Against Alleged Unfair Labor Practices, 56 MICH. L. REV. 102, 103 (1957); 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1104, 1107 (1965). See Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S.
261 (1940). See generally Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpet Layers Local 419, 410 F.2d 1148
(10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 655 (1970). Evidence that the protection of public
rights is the main concern of the NLRA includes the stated primary purpose of the Act to
maintain the full flow of commerce, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970), as well as the defeat of proposed
amendments to let private parties directly seek injunctive relief under the Act. 93 CONG. REC.
4833-37, 4847 (1947).
3. 3 DAVIS § 22.13, at 275; Jaffe, supra note 2, at 724; The Charging Party, supra note 2,
at 797.
4. See, e.g., UAW Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965); Terminal Freight Handling
Co. v. Solien, 444 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Mar. 20,
1972) (No. 71-609); Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers Local 610, 440 F.2d 124 (8th Cir.
1971); Concrete Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1971); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Carpet Layers Local 419, 410 F.2d 1148 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 655
(1970); Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1966); Teamsters Local 282 v.
NLRB, 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964); Textile Workers v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Marine Eng'rs Ass'n No. 13 v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1953).
5. Terminal Freight Handling Co. v. Solien, 444 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1972) (No. 71-609); Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers Local
610, 440 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1971); Concrete Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 61 (5th Cir.
1971).
6. Forcing an employee to join any labor or employer organization, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(A) (1970); conducting an illegal secondary boycott, id. at § 158(b)(4)(B); forcing
an employer to recognize a union other than that already representing his employees, id. at
§ 158(b)(4)(C); conducting illegal secondary picketing, id. at § 158(b)(7); and contracting with
one employer to boycott another, id. at § 158(e).
7. The continual use of federal court injunctions to curtail union activity, see Brotherhood
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When such a charge is filed the NLRB is required to conduct a
preliminary investigation which takes priority over all other cases. 8 If
the investigating officer finds that there is reasonable cause to believe
the charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he "shall"
petition a United States District Court for injunctive relief pending
final adjudication by the NLRB?
In Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers Local 610,11 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, relying primarily on the legislatively
intended exclusivity" of the NLRB's privilege to seek labor injunc-
tions, held that the charging party in a mandatory injunction proceed-
ing was entitled to neither full party status nor the right to intervene.
In that case, the charging party sought full party status in the district
court injunction proceeding but was permitted to make only a limited
appearance.1 2 On appeal, 3 the court of appeals concluded that the
of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30,40 (1957), led to the 1932 passage
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970), which greatly limited the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes. Marine Cooks & Stewards v.
Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 (1960); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpet Layers Local
419,410 F.2d 1148, 1150 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 655 (1970);4 J. JENKINS,
LABOR LAW 56 (1971); see Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970). An exception
to the Norris-LaGuardia policy, section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160 (1970), permits the NLRB to seek federal court injunctions in certain circumstances, J.
JENKINs, supra at 85, 90; see 29 U.S.C. § 160j), (1) (1970), in order, some courts have held, to
"preserve the status quo" of the parties' relationship pending litigation. Schauffler v. United
Ass'n of Journeymen Local 420, 218 F.2d 476, 479-80 (3d Cir. 1955); S. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947). But see Henderson v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local
701, 420 F.2d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1969). The Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National Labor
Relations Act in most cases deny to all but the NLRB access to federal court injunctions in
labor disputes. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 734. Faced with an inability to secure a federal court
injunction to halt an unfair labor practice, a private party may also be unable to secure a state
court injunction under a state labor relations act due to federal pre-emption. NLRA coverage
is so comprehensive that the potential conflict between state and federal rulings has been
sufficient to invalidate much of the state regulation in the field. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776,
346 U.S. 485, 490, 498, 500 (1953); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1950); La Crosse
Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 18, 25 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York
Board, 330 U.S. 767,773 (1947).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1971).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970). See pp. 198-99 infra for a discussion of a recent court of ap-
peals decision which allows an element of discretion in this directive to the investigating officer.
10. 440 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1971).
11. A proposal to amend the NLRA to permit private individuals, as well as the NLRB,
to seek federal court injunctions to halt unfair labor practices was defeated by a Senate vote of
62 to 28. 93 CONG. REc. 4835, 4847 (1947).
12. The charging parties were allowed to be present with counsel at hearings, to introduce
evidence, to file briefs, to be informed of all actions taken in the case, to keep the court advised
of pertinent developments, and to receive copies of all documents filed. 420 F.2d at 126. This
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wording and iegislative history of the N L RA injunction exception and
the overall legislative scheme of labor injunctions prohibited the vindi-
cation of purely private rights in the district court proceeding and
therefore precluded the charging party's intervention or full party
status."'
In contrast to the public right position of the Solien court, the
Supreme Court has suggested that a charging party's rights can be
enforced simultaneously with those of the public:
In short, we think that the statutory pattern of the Labor Act does not
dichotomize "public" as opposed to "private" interests. Rather, the two inter-
blend in the intricate statutory scheme.'5
Of course, the Solien court accorded the charging party a limited
appearance," thus not forging a revolutionary departure from the
contrasts with the rights granted the charging party before the NLRB during the unfair labor
practice hearing itself, which include the right to appear in person or by counsel or other
representative, to introduce documentary or other evidence, and to call, examine, and cross-
examine witnesses. 29 C.F.R. § 102.38 (1971).
13. The charging parties appealed the district court's refusal to grant them full party status.
Even though the labor dispute had been settled, the court of appeals ruled that the question was
not moot since the settlement between the Regional Director and the charged party had not yet
been approved by the General Counsel and the repetition of the unlawful secondary boycott was
still a possibility. 440 F.2d at 126, 127.
14. The court noted that while section 10(1) provides that service of process shall make the
charged labor organization "a party to the suit," the section further provides that the charging
party shall only be "given an opportunity to appear by counsel and present any relevant
testimony." 440 F.2d at 128. The court also quoted the Senate Report on the proposed section
10(1), which states: "[W]e have provided that the Board, acting in the public interest and not
in vindication of purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief. ... S. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947) (emphasis added). The court reasoned that in light of the restrictive
federal approach to labor injunctions as reflected by the Norris LaGuardia and National Labor
Relations Acts, any granting of additional procedural rights to parties in section 10(l) proceed-
ings must be clearly authorized by statute, and such legislative authorization had been held
lacking in a case which denied the charging party the right to appeal an adverse section 10(1)
proceeding decision, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpet Layers Local 419, 410 F.2d 1148, 1150
(10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 655 (1971).
15. UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 220 (1965). See Concrete Materials, Inc. v. NLRB,
440 F.2d 61, 67 (5th Cir. 1971). Noting in Scofield that Congress had made a "careful adjust-
ment of individual and administrative interests," 382 U.S. at 209, the Court cited the "clear
words" of section 10(f) of the NLRA which give "any person aggrieved" by a Board order
the right to appellate review. 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1970). See Extent of Discretion, supra note
2, at 104. Provisions for the protection of vital private rights of the charging party can also be
seen in his ability to file the unfair labor practice charge, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970), 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.9 (1971), his formal recognition as a "party" at the adjudicative stage, 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.8 (1971), and his power to call and cross-examine witnesses, file exceptions, and file
petitions for reconsideration, 29 C.F.R. § 102.46 (1971). See Retail Clerks Local 137 v. Food
Employers Council, Inc., 351 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1965).
16. See note 12 supra.
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middle position advocated by the Supreme Court. However, the pub-
lic right orientation of the decision prevents the charging party from
calling, examining, or cross-examining witnesses,' 7 and raises the pos-
sibility that a charging party's inability to fully present his case in
district court might result in an unjustified denial of injunctive relief.
By making at least limited provision for mandatory injunctions, the
Congress recognized that certain activities posed grave and immediate
danger not only to the public but to the individual victim.'8 While
eventual NLRB action on the unfair labor practice may vindicate
public rights, an injunction is necessary since the nature of the offense
might meanwhile destroy the victim. These considerations indicate the
desirability of allowing intervention to assure the fullest possible pres-
entation of the case. The charging party's role can still be controlled
since the investigating officer must initially institute the suit," and the
district court's decision whether to enjoin is not appealable.2"
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit further subordinated
private interests in mandatory injunction proceedings in another 1971
case, Terminal Freight Handling Co. v. Solien, '21 holding that the
NLRB agent has discretion to either seek the injunction immediately
or permit a slight delay in hopes of a settlement. 22 The charging party
17. See note 12 supra.
18. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3, 8, 27 (1947). See also NLRA § 10(1),
29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970), which provides for an exparte labor injunction when the charging
party is faced with "substantial and irreparable injury." Id.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1)(1970);29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1971); The Changing Party, supra note
2, at 798; Extent of Discretion, supra note 2, at 112.
20. 440 F.2d at 131; see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpet Layers Local 419, 410 F.2d 1148,
1151 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 655 (1970).
21. 444 F.2d 699 (1971).
22. After discussing the somewhat inconclusive legislative history behind the seemingly
mandatory language ofsection 10(1), the court reasoned that the Regional Director was obliged
to seek section 10(1) injunctive relief only after determining that "a complaint should issue,"
i.e., after hopes of a settlement had been dashed. 444 F.2d at 708. This conclusion seems
contrary to that of another court of appeals, which maintained that "the Regional Director's
discretion as to whether injunctive relief should be sought is limited to whether or not reasonable
cause exists to believe that one of the unfair labor practice provisions enumerated in section
10(l) has been violated . . . . It is not for the Regional Director to substitute his own ideas of
how best to deal with alleged unfair labor practices for those of the Congress." Retail Clerks
Local 137 v. Food Employers Council, Inc., 351 F.2d 525, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1965); cf. Herzog
v. Parsons, 181 F.2d 781, 784-85 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Douds v. Teamsters Local 294, 75 F. Supp.
414 (N.D.N.Y. 1947); 93 CONG. REc. 6506 (daily ed. June 6, 1947) (analysis of section 10(1)
by Senator Murray, protesting mandatory nature of the 10(/) injunction).
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contended that the statute offered no room for discretion. 23 Even
though the discretion allowed the Board officer by the court merely
resulted in a short delay in which the officer could seek cessation of
the unfair practice, 24 the danger of such discretion soon became ap-
parent, for the charging party was forced to request cessation a second
time.2 The period during which a charging party must endure certain
unfair labor practices without the benefit of injunctive relief provided
by the NLRA may be so crucial that perhaps the interpretatiohn that
Congress intended no administrative discretion in these matters re-
flects the better balance of public and private rights.
Objections to Compromise Settlements
At any time between the filing of an unfair labor practice charge
and the moment when the record of the case is filed for court enforce-
ment of the NLRB order, the Board may modify or set aside any
finding or order it has issued. 21 Courts of appeals have split sharply
over a charging party's procedural rights if he objects to a settlement
between the NL RB and the party charged with the violation. An early
case which faced the issue is Marine Engineers Association No. 13 v.
NLR B, 27 decided in 1953 by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. Marine Engineers relied upon the Board's Rules and Regula-
tions and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to hold that once
a complaint has been issued by the Board the charging party is enti-
tled to an evidentiary hearing on its objections to the settlement.28 This
23. The charging party based its position on the statutory language:
If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be
referred has reasonable cause to believe such a charge is true and that a complaint should
issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United States District Court within
any district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged to have
occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts his business, for appropriate injunc-
tive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. 29
U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
24. 444 F.2d at 708.
25. Id. at 702.
26. Section 10(d) of the NLRA provides that:
Until the record in a case shall have been filed in a court, as hereinafter provided, the
Board may at any time upon reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem
proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or order made or issued by
it. 29 U.S.C. § 160(d) (1970).
27. 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1953).
28. The court reasoned that since the charging party is within the definition of "party" in
the Board's Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.8 (1971), then the charging party is an
"interested party" who should be given an opportunity "to the extent that the parties are unable
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approach was only partially accepted by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Textile Workers v. NLRB,2  which
held that the objecting charging party is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing only when the NLRB fails to justify its adoption of the com-
promise settlement on the record. This court also rejected the argu-
ment that the charging party's consent was necessary to validate a
settlement, concluding that the foundations for such a position, the
Board's Rules and Regulations and the NLRA, were too ambigu-
ously worded to justify imposing such a rule on the Board."
In 1964 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the
Third, Circuit's 1953 interpretation of the APA and flatly ruled that
a charging party has no right to an evidentiary hearing on its objec-
tions to a settlement.3 1 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
responded to this challenge by buttressing its earlier viewpoint and
holding that a Regional Director does not have absolute authority to
adopt a settlement agreement once a complaint has been issued. An
evidentiary hearing must be granted to afford the charging party an
opportunity to explain its objections.3 1
so to determine a controversy by consent, [for a] hearing. ... as provided by the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(2) (1970). 202 F.2d at 548-49.
29. 294 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
30. The court noted that no provision in the NLRA provides that the charging party, by
mere virtue of its status, is able to veto a settlement, and that the rules of the Board are not
clear about the matter. The court felt that the relevant provisions of the Board's Rules and
Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.8, 101.9 (1971), merely indicate that the charging party is given
the opportunity for submission of facts and argument, and is recognized as having a substantial
part in assisting the Board in fulfilling its public responsibilities. 294 F.2d at 740.
31. Teamsters Local 282 v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, 800, 801 (2d Cir. 1964). The court
maintained that section 5(b) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1970), which only applies to
"interested parties," id., does not embrace the charging party since the charging party has no
legally recognized private interest in an unfair labor practice proceeding. 339 F.2d at 800, 801.
The court insisted that section 5(b) did not refer to the "persons entitled to a hearing" in section
5(a) nor those persons who may be entitled to review per section 10(a), basing its conclusions
largely on the legislative history of the APA. Id. at 800, 801. In surveying the APA's legislative
history, however, the court seems to have overlooked the interpretation of section 5(b) by
Pennsylvania Congressman Walter, Chairman of the House subcommittee that studied and
introduced the proposed APA to the House: "Subsection (b) of section 5 simply provides that,
apart from notice [provided in subsection (a)], parties must be afforded opportunity for the
settlement of cases in whole or in part and, to the extent that issues are not so settled, by hearing
and decision in compliance with the later provisions of the bill." 92 CONG. REc. 5651 (1946).
This indicates that "party" and "interested party" were used interchangeably in the two above-
discussed subsections of the APA and that the Teamsters court might have applied an overly
restricted interpretation to the latter of those terms.
32. Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 535, 536 (3d Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 1972:115
A DMINISTRA TIVE LA W-1971
Against this background in 1971 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Concrete Materials, Inc. v. NLR B11 sought an equita-
ble balance between the rights of the private charging party and the
interests of the public. Two unions charged with unlawful secondary
boycott entered into a settlement agreement with the NLRB Regional
Director over the objection of the charging party. The NLRB refused
to give the charging party an evidentiary hearing on its objections, 34
and the charging party petitioned the court of appeals to set aside the
order allowing settlement. The court denied the petition and held that
a charging party is entitled to a hearing on its objections to a settle-
ment only when the objections raise a material issue of disputed fact
or when the Board fails to justify its acceptance of the settlements.35
The court granted that the public right dogma had been rejected and
that the charging party's private rights must be considered. However,
the court felt that there was no explicit statutory authorization for
allowing the charging party a veto of the settlement.3 6 In any event,
reasoned the court, the legitimate right of the charging party to effec-
tive appellate review37 was adequately safeguarded by its decision re-
quiring a hearing if the Board failed to justify the compromise or if
it was necessary to give the charging party an opportunity to present
its interpretation of the factual situation for the record.38
33. 440 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1971).
34. [T]he Company indicated that it was contemplating a private damage action
against the Unions under Section 303 of the Act [29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970)], and that it
expected to rely on the Board's finding that the Unions had violated Section 8(b)(4) of
the Act as resjudicata as to the Unions' liability in its action under Section 303. 440
F.2d at 63.
35. 440 F.2d at 68.
36. The court felt that the decisions rendered in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
led to the maxim, "no settlement agreement can be effectuated by the Board without the consent
of the charging party," an approach which violated the "legislative scheme." 440 F.2d at 68
n.9. Moreover, the court decided that the charging party is not an "interested party" whose
consent is needed (citing Teamsters Local 282 v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964)), 440 F.2d
at 68.
37. See UAW Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 210 (1965); 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
38. 440 F.2d at 68. The charging party planned to seek the private suit remedy provided in
NLRA § 303(b):
Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason or [sic] any violation of
subsection (a) [unfair labor practices defined in 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970)] may sue
therefor in any district court of the United States . . . or in any other court having
jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost
of the suit. 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970).
It was evident in that case that there is little "public interest" justification for providing a




The Concrete Materials decision is a clear effort to balance public
and private interests while supporting the NLRA's primary goal of
resolving labor disputes and while acknowledging the vital role of
settlement agreements. The court noted that to automatically grant
the charging party a hearing after the resolution of a labor dispute
does not necessarily further the public interest. However, the court
was concerned with the protection afforded private rights by the right
to appellate review and demanded that pre-review procedures preserve
the efficacy of that right. 3 This position, while avoiding the undesira-
ble extremities of exclusively supporting public or private rights,
rightly recognizes the demise of the public right dogma while protect-
ing NLRB administrative procedures from needless hearings. A re-
cent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
wholeheartedly adopts the compromise position of Concrete
Materials.0
Appellate Review
As has been mentioned," the NLRA safeguards the charging
party against administrative error by giving him or any other "person
aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole
or in part the relief sought," an opportunity to seek modification or
nullification of the order in a court of appeals. The charging party's
entrenched right43 to appellate review has been viewed as producing
benefits which justify occasional impairment of administrative expe-
diency.44 However, it must be recognized that the value of judicial
review is dependent upon the various procedural prerogatives ac-
corded the charging party at different stages of the unfair labor prac-
tice proceeding. Denial of a full participatory role at the investigative
stage,45 refusal of full party status and the consequent inability to call
39. An alternate viewpoint, consistent with the more liberal decisions rendered by the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, see notes 27-28, 32 supra and accompanying text, would be
to grant the hearing as a corollary of the charging party's status as a full-fledged party through-
out the unfair labor practice proceeding.
40. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers Local 357, 445 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir.
1971).
41. See p. 201 supra.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1970).
43. UAW Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 210 (1965).
44. Note, NLRB Settlement Agreements-Right of a Charging Party to an Evidentiary
Hearing, 20 Sw. L.J. 901, 907 (1966).
45. Once an unfair labor practice charge is filed with the NLRB, an investigation is
conducted by a Regional Board officer on behalf of the independent General Counsel. 29
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and examine witnesses in a mandatory injunction proceeding, and the
rejection of a request for an evidentiary hearing on objections to a
compromise settlement can all significantly affect the presentation of
the charging party's appeal. Professor Jaffe notes that the NLRA "is
almost alone in committing to the sole enforcement of a public agency
a policy which is universally recognized as vindicating individual and
group interests."46 The realization that victims of unfair labor prac-
tices are largely dependent upon the adequacy of Board proceedings
for the protection of their interests demands that courts closely exam-
ine any circumscription of procedural rights which would reduce the
one safeguard available to the charging party-judicial review of
administrative actions.
V. REFUND POWERS
FPC REFUND POWERS UNDER THE NATURAL GAS ACT
The "refund power" is the equitable power of a regulatory agency
to order the return of rate charges improperly assessed.' The most
retroactive and effective application of the refund power is the "repar-
ation order," defined as the assessment of damages caused by the
unreasonableness of past rates.2 Although some federal agencies have
C.F.R. § 101.4 (1971); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 833 (1971); 1 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 2.53, at 135 (1968). The
charging party is expected to cooperate with the Board officer, but may participate in the
investigation only to the extent of furnishing facts and informally presenting his theories of
applicable law. DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra, at 833-34. If the investigating officer feels that
the charge is without merit he may formally refuse to issue a complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 101.6
(1971); DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra, at 834; see 29 C.F.R. § 102.19 (1971). Although this
refusal is appealable to the General Counsel, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.6, 102.19 (1971), DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra, at 834, if the determination of the investigating officer is affirmed, the
charging party has no further avenue of appeal. Contractors' Ass'n v. NLRB, 295 F.2d 526
(3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813 (1962); J. JENKINS, supra; DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,
supra, at 834.
46. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 726.
1. The refund power is effectuated through use of the "refund order," which may be
fashioned in a variety of forms. One common use, for example, is the return of a portion of
increased rate charges which are allowed to take effect pending final administrative approval.
See Note, Use of the Refund Device in Rate Regulation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1950);
notes 38-39 infra and accompanying text.
2. See Clark, Protection of the Consumer Under the Natural Gas Act-Refunds and
Reparations, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 261, 270 (1945). This broad definition of "reparation"
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